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DAVID L. DUNCAN, State 
Treasurer, 
Defendants-
Appellants . 
Case No. 14846 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from a declaratory judgment by the Third 
Judicial District for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., holding House Bill 
No. 373, 41st Legislature and House Bill No. 91, 41st 
Legislature 1976 constitutional. 
A. WALLY SANDACK 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondents 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. MCCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellants 
FILE 
FEB -7 1977 
Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: SINCE THE MONEY IN THE INSURANCE 
FUND BELONGS TO CONTRIBUTING 
EMPLOYERS, THE STATE CANNOT TAKE 
MONEY FROM THE INSURANCE FUND 
EXCEPT TO PAY THE BENEFITS DUE 
TO EMPLOYEES, AND THE COSTS OF 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE FUND. THE 
DIVERSION OF TRUST FUND MONEY FOR 
THE OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT WITH-
OUT COMPENSATION, DENIES DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW TO CONTRIBUTING EMPLOYERS. 
THIS DIVERSION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED 
BY THE DESIRABILITY OF THE INTENDED 
USE, INDIRECT NON-EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT, 
OR CLAIMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CON-
VENIENCE 1 
CASES CITED 
Chez, Atty. Gen. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 90 U. 447, 
62, P.2d 549, 108A.L.R. 365 (1936) 2,4,5,8 
M & K Corporation v. Industrial Comm., 112 U. 488, 
189 P.2d 132 (1948) 7 
Moran v. State, Okla., 534 P.2d 1282, 1288 (1975)... 8 
Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm., 102 U. 492, 132 
P.2d 376 (1942) 7 
Sims v. Moeur, 19 P.2d 679 (Ariz. 1933) 6 
Snow v. Keddington, 113 U. 325, 195 P.2d 234 (1948) 5 
Trade Comm. v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 21 U.2d 431, 446 
P.2d 958 (1968) 5 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS CON'T. 
Page 
State v. Musgrave, 370 P.2d 778 (Idaho, 1962)... 3,4 
Wilstead v. Industrial Comm., 17 U.2d 214, 407 
P.2d 692 (1965) 5 
Woldberg v. Industrial Comm., 74 U. 309, 279 
P. 609 (1929) 7 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 35-3-1, U.C.A. 1953 2 
Section 35-3-3, U.C.A. 1953 2 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARLYLE F. GRONNING, in his 
official capacity as Chairman 
Commissioner of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent. 
-vs-
HERBERT F. SMART, in his 
official capacity as Director 
of Finance, Department of 
Finance, State of Utah, and 
Administrator of the State 
Insurance Fund; DAVID S. 
MONSON, State Auditor; and 
DAVID L. DUNCAN, State 
Treasurer, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
Case No. 14846 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE THE MONEY IN THE INSURANCE FUND 
BELONGS TO CONTRIBUTING EMPLOYERS, THE 
STATE CANNOT TAKE MONEY FROM THE IN-
SURANCE FUND EXCEPT TO PAY THE BENEFITS 
DUE TO EMPLOYEES, AND THE COSTS OF 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE FUND. THE DIVER-
SION OF TRUST FUND MONEY FOR THE 
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OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT WITHOUT 
COMPENSATION, DENIES DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW TO CONTRIBUTING EMPLOYERS. 
THIS DIVERSION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED 
BY THE DESIRABILITY OF THE INTENDED 
USE, INDIRECT NON-EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT, 
OR CLAIMS OF. ADMINISTRATIVE CON-
VENIENCE. 
Respondent seeks to avoid the clear holding of 
Chez v. Industrial Commission, 90 U. 447, 62 P.2d 549 (1936), 
by asserting that the case has no applicability to 
"administration" of the State Insurance Fund [R.B. p. 10] . 
The argument starts with the supposition that because 
sixty percent of the State's employers insure v/ith the 
Fund, that the Fund should pay sixty percent of the 
costs of the Industrial Commission's safety programs. 
[R-54, R.B. p. 3]. The next step in the reasoning is 
that because the Fund may employ inspectors (§ 35-3-1, 
U.C.A. 1953) and do things necessary or convenient to 
the administration of its insurance business (§ 35-3-3, 
U.C.A. 1953), it may pay over funds to the Industrial 
Commission to pay for sixty percent of the costs of 
carrying out the functions of Commission inspections. 
[R.B. pp. 6-7] . The position is that the administrative 
convenience is supported by prior disbursements or so 
called "public funds" [R.B. p. 11] by the Fund which is 
an "instrumentality of the government" [R.B. p. 9-10] 
-2-
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although the Fund has no responsibility for the work of 
the Industrial Commission [R.B. p. 10]. Since there is 
no sense in duplicating costly safety programs, the Fund 
should pay part of the costs of the Commission's programs 
since the Commission has the expertise and capability to 
conduct all phases of the program and authority to enforce 
regulations and safety orders while the Fund does not. 
Since the Legislature has declared the programs to be in 
the public interest and since the Fund has an interest 
in safety programs, and since "Due Process is a rule of 
reason and utilization of Fund resources in a reasonable 
manner partially supporting safety related programs 
established by the Industrial Commission throughout the 
state does not violate that rule." [R.B. p. 16], no 
important rights or constitutional issues are involved 
and the expenditures are proper Legislature determinations. 
While admiration must be expressed for the 
ingenuity of the arguments, the Appellants must respect-
fully disagree with the conclusion and with the reasoning 
employed since the cases cited by Respondent really do 
not support the essential positions taken in Respondent's 
arguments. 
State v. Musgrave, 370>P<.2d 778\(Idaho, 1962):,, 
is cited by Respondent [R.B. pp. 9-10] as authority that 
-3-
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the Fund is an instrumentality of the government, thus, 
somehow implying that transfer of its funds to the 
Industrial Commission would be proper. The case actually, 
holds that the employment of an attorney by the Fund 
manager for prosecution of subrogation claims on a 
contingent fee basis was lawful since the money did not 
belong to the State. The case discloses that the Idaho 
law sets up a Fund very similar to our own statutory 
plan as interpreted in Chez v. Industrial Commission, 
supra. The court holds that "The money in the fund 
does not belong to the state and is not in the state 
•treasury1 within the meaning of Art. 7, § 13, of 
the Constitution. It is deposited with the state 
'treasurer1 as 'custodian1 and is held by him as such 
for the contributing employers and the beneficiaries 
of the compensation law, and for the payment of the 
costs of operation of the fund.11 State v. Musgrave, 
supra at 782. To the extent that the fund may be 
considered as an instrumentality of government, the 
court said that the ". . . fund is an agency of the 
state for the purpose of carrying on and effectuating 
a proprietary function as distinguished from a govern-
mental function. It serves a 'public purpose' but not 
£ 'governmental purpose' ". State v. Musgrave, supra 
at 782 (emphasis added). 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Snow v. Keddington, 113 U. 325, 195 P.2d 234 
(1948), in so far as it is applicable, states a rule that 
a statute is presumed to be constitutional. Appellants 
concede this rule to be correct, but assert that the 
decision otherwise has no application to thecase now 
before the Court. 
Another Utah case, Wilstead v. Industrial 
Commission, 17 U.2d 214, 407 P.2d 692 (1965), is a 
review of an award of the Industrial Commission. 
Wilstead briefly states that appellants argument for 
more compensation would make the Workmen's Compensation 
Act an unemployment compensation act and briefly states 
the purposes of the Act to be the assurance of income 
to the injured employee during total disability, to 
compensate for permanent disability, to provide a simple 
and speedy procedure, and to place the burden of injury 
on industry. Again, Appellants have no disagreement 
with this case, believing that the purposes so announced 
echo the holding of Chez v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 21 U.2d 
431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968) upheld the State Unfair Practices Act 
respecting sale of merchandise at less than cost plus 
6% as "loss leaders". This case again recites the 
presumptions of constitutionality of statutes, declares 
-5-
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that judicial determinations of wisdom or desirability 
of legislation should not be indulged. It also contains 
a definition of due process (21 U.2d 431, 441) which 
certainly does not preclude the protection of individual 
rights which Appellants here claim belong to the paying 
employers to have the Fund's expenditures confined to 
the purposes of the Fund. 
Sims v. Moeur, 19 P.2d 679 (Ariz. 1933)-., held that 
Commissioners could not expend money belonging to the 
Insurance Fund on request of some individual employers 
to defeat an iniative measure which proposed to abolish 
their offices and to repeal the Workmen's Compensation 
Law. Technically, the case permitted the Governor to 
dismiss the Commissioners who expended $16,32 6.60 of 
the Fund's reserve in legal fees and in other efforts 
to defeat the iniative, and were therefore guilty of 
inefficiency and malfeasance in office. The court 
said " . . . This fund the law intends shall be 
sacredly and carefully protected and conserved. The 
relation of the commission to the fund is one of 
particular confidence and trust. The commission may 
not use the fund for any purpose other than expressed 
or necessarily implied in the act creating the fund. . ." 
19 P.2d 679, 682, emp. added. 
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Woldberg v. Industrial Commission, 74 U. 309, 
279 P. 609 (1929), simply held that the Supreme Court had 
no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Commission when 
the petition for review was filed more than thirty days 
after the Commission had denied a petition for rehearing. 
M & K Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 112 
U. 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948), related entirely to the question 
whether a death arose out of or in connection with employ-
ment. In this connection, this Court held that the Act 
should be liberally construed. 
Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Commission, 102 
U. 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942), presented two questions for 
review. " . . . (1) Does the evidence justify the finding 
of the Commission. . . . (2) If such injury was suffered, 
does the record justify the finding that such injury was 
a proximate cause of death. . . . " 132 P.2d 376, 377. 
With respect to Commission's receipt of hearsay, this 
court said, "Legislation such as this Act, made with a 
view to further social interests, must be interpreted not 
only from the judicial, but also the social point of view, 
and so as to give material justice its due, while formal 
jurisprudence has to stand back. *. . ." 132 P.2d 376, 379. 
With respect to Respondent's position, it is 
apparent that taxation of employers, employees and the 
-7-
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public generally, including taxation of employers who 
insure with the Fund, would be the source of the money 
necessary to supply the 40% of the cost of the Commi-
ssion's safety programs. The employer who selects 
the Fund to cover his requirement to assure that 
workmen who are injured or become diseased from their 
occupations would be denied the equal protection of 
the law if they had to pay their money (Chez v. 
Industrial Commission, supra) through the Fund to 
support 60% of the programs while other employers pay 
nothing through private insurers, or nothing if self 
insured. To say that the Fund has an interest in 
safety is not to say that the other employers or the 
public do not. 
Moran v. State, (Okl. 1975) 534 P.2d 1282, 
1288, would hold that such a diversion of Fund money 
would impair the obligation of the insurance contract 
between employers who pay premiums and the Fund. 
Appellants submit that no concept of ad-
ministrative convenience or indirect non-exclusive 
benefit to the Fund can justify taking funds which 
belong to private persons (those employers who pay 
premiums into the Fund) for public use (the payment 
-8-
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of Industrial Commission expenses incurred in the 
exercise of State police power) without compensation. 
Such action clearly denies these employers due process 
of law, and the Legislature may not disregard these 
rights when the State is the Trustee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. MCCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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